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ABSTRACT
Network data packet capture and replay capabilities are ba-
sic requirements for forensic analysis of faults and security-
related anomalies, as well as for testing and development.
Cyber-physical networks, in which data packets are used to
monitor and control physical devices, must operate within
strict timing constraints, in order to match the hardware
devices’ characteristics. Standard network monitoring tools
are unsuitable for such systems because they cannot guar-
antee to capture all data packets, may introduce their own
traffic into the network, and cannot reliably reproduce the
original timing of data packets. Here we present a high-
speed network forensics tool specifically designed for cap-
turing and replaying data traffic in Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition systems. Unlike general-purpose “packet
capture” tools it does not affect the observed network’s data
traffic and guarantees that the original packet ordering is
preserved. Most importantly, it allows replay of network
traffic precisely matching its original timing. The tool was
implemented by developing novel user interface and back-
end software for a special-purpose network interface card.
Experimental results show a clear improvement in data cap-
ture and replay capabilities over standard network monitor-
ing methods and general-purpose forensics solutions.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Network security; •Applied
computing→Network forensics; •Networks→Cyber-
physical networks;
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1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental need for any forensics investigator or en-
gineer trying to understand an anomaly is the ability to
clearly see what happened. Having done this, and having
implemented some sort of mitigation to prevent the incident
recurring, the investigator’s next requirement is the ability
to accurately reproduce the original attack to confirm that
it can no longer succeed.
These requirements are met by tools that can capture
and store data traffic, and replay it later. Many such tools
are available for general-purpose data communications net-
works. Here, however, we are concerned with the special-
case of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
networks as used in cyber-physical systems. Such networks
offer significant challenges to the investigator because they
are typically safety-critical systems which must run continu-
ally without interruption [30]. Furthermore, network traffic
in such systems is subject to strict timing constraints, so
any security tools used must be unintrusive.
Our own research is motivated by the need to secure the
next generation of Ethernet-based electricity distribution
control networks. Monitoring is required both during test-
ing and as a continuous process in live critical infrastruc-
ture installations to allow fault diagnosis, intrusion detec-
tion, and analysis of events that resulted in serious injury
or death [27]. Electricity control networks consist of nu-
merous inter-connected, voltage-transforming substations,
each one connected remotely to the company’s headquar-
ters. As part of a nation’s critical infrastructure, substation
design and operations are governed by strict standards, in-
cluding their communications networks [14]. In particular,
relevant Ethernet-based protocols, such as “GOOSE”, have
strict timing constraints [14].
In such an environment, a range of personnel including
research and development engineers, testing and fault inves-
tigation engineers, asset management teams, and field oper-
ation engineers must be able to perform a range of network
analysis tasks such as assessing packet transmission times
across a network, capturing data for forensic fault analy-
sis, and replaying data in an isolated test environment to
see if anomalies are repeatable and if potential solutions are
effective.
SCADA engineers have traditionally been reluctant to in-
corporate system monitoring and analysis tools that could
interfere with safety-critical, time-sensitive data traffic. At
best, a control system’s Human-Machine Interaction (HMI)
software will log major system events in a ‘historian’ data-
base, but engineers typically have limited ability to observe
low-level network traffic. Our goal, therefore was to develop
a network forensics tool which is suitable for use in safety-
critical systems such as those found in electricity substa-
tions. Specifically, we needed a tool which could be used
both in a “live” system to capture anomalous events and in
a substation testing facility to reproduce security incidents.
Therefore, our forensics tool needed to allow network traffic
to be captured and replayed at speeds compatible with the
“hard” real-time constraints of the cyber-physical system.
In particular, all packets must be captured accurately, with-
out affecting the original network’s traffic in any way, and
replayed data traffic must precisely reproduce the original
timing of packets.
General-purpose Network Interface Cards (NICs) are un-
suitable for this purpose because (a) they are inherently
‘noisy’, introducing their own data packets into the network,
(b) they are controlled by standard multi-tasking operating
systems and are therefore subject to arbitrary pre-emption,
and (c) they have only the low-precision processor clock
available for timestamping. To overcome all these problems
we developed a novel solution based on a special-purpose
network interface device, the Endace Data Acquisition and
Generation Card [7], acting as a network tap and synchro-
nised to GPS time. This gave us the ability to monitor
network traffic silently, without introducing any extra traf-
fic onto the network, and to both capture and insert data
packets at speeds high enough to match SCADA data traffic.
User interface and back-end software was developed to al-
low straightforward capture and replay of data traffic, inline
Berkeley Packet Filtering (BPF), as well as simple packet
modification and filtering operations during replay. Exper-
imental results show that the resulting tool compares very
favourably with attempts to use standard networking tools
for SCADA system forensics.
2. PREVIOUS AND RELATED WORK
Our concern in this research was supporting security-crit-
ical SCADA network analysis by capturing and replaying
network traffic with high timing accuracy. There are, of
course, many existing tools for performing packet capture,
or “pcap”, operations in communication networks.
Primitive libraries of functions such as libpcap provide ba-
sic network interfacing, packet capture and filtering capabil-
ities [18], and are the basis of many software utilities. Build-
ing on this, command-line packet analysers such as tcpdump
support capture and analysis of network traffic [19]. Such
tools can capture packets from a Network Interface Card or
analyse previously-captured “pcap” files. As command-line
tools, they can be incorporated into other tools and scripts.
For instance, for users wanting a Graphical User Interface,
popular tools such as Wireshark add the ability to visually
examine captured packets [24].
Apart from observing traffic, there are also general net-
working tools for generating or “injecting” network traffic
onto a communications link. For instance, Tcpreplay is “a
suite of free, open-source, UNIX utilities for editing and re-
playing previously captured network traffic, originally de-
signed to replay malicious traffic patterns to intrusion de-
tection systems” [3]. It allows network traffic captured and
stored in local files by tools such as tcpdump to be re-
inserted into the network, thereby allowing previously-seen
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Figure 1: Physical architecture of our SCADA net-
work forensics system.
security attacks to be reproduced at will. Like tcpdump, it
is a command-line tool and is designed to work with stan-
dard network cards [3]. Another such tool is Nemsis, “a
command-line network packet crafting and injection utility
well-suited for testing Network Intrusion Detection Systems,
firewalls, IP stacks, etc” [22].
A central concern of our research is to be unintrusive,
in order not to affect the required timing of packets in the
SCADA system. For instance, the GOOSE protocol used in
electricity substations requires a packet latency no greater
than 3 milliseconds [14]. Some existing packet capture and
injection tools such as pktd are similarly designed to meet
strict performance goals, but in this case the issue is to min-
imise the tool’s footprint on its host computer [9], rather
than a concern with affecting the timing of data packets
on the network. Another early tool with goals similar to
ours was nCap which aimed to overcome the limitations of
general-purpose operating systems for capturing high-speed
traffic by using proprietary network adapters [6]. More re-
cently, commercial tools such as Sniffer10G have provided
support for high-speed capture and replay of Ethernet traf-
fic [21].
None of these tools, however, were specifically designed for
SCADA network traffic, as needed for diagnosing anomalies
in a cyber-physical control system. In particular, tools re-
lying on standard Network Interface Cards are potentially
noisy, do not guarantee to preserve the order of packets,
nor do they have precise timing capabilities. While none
of these properties may be crucial in a general-purpose net-
work, where there are no “hard” real-time constraints and
packets routinely arrive at their destination out of order,
in critical infrastructure obtaining and timing packets ac-
curately and in their original order is essential [10]. Our
approach solves all of these problems.
3. HARDWARE DESIGN
In this section we present the options and decisions that
led to the physical architecture of our solution (Figure 1).
Section 4 then describes its software implementation and
Section 5 analyses the overall system’s performance.
3.1 Access points for network captures: In-
line taps versus mirror ports
Our first concern was the need to capture all network traf-
fic, without losing any data packets. There are two main
options for network traffic capture, inline taps and mirror
(SPAN) ports [23]. Inline taps offer greater certainty that
all network traffic is acquired, because mirror ports may
drop malformed packets, or may stop mirroring data alto-
gether if switch computation buffers fill [17]. There are also
problems with mirror porting if Virtual Local Area Networks
(VLANs) are used, because the mirror ports need to be con-
figured to recognise VLAN traffic. Packets with VLAN tags
that do not match the port settings are dropped. VLANs are
a recommended method of segmenting networks in critical
infrastructure [16] and are common in critical infrastructure,
so this issue is significant. Further, switches will inject their
own packets and may modify existing packets, especially to
change their priority [5]. For all of these reasons, a mirror
port may not be passive [11], so for critical infrastructure
purposes inline taps were our preference.
(On the other hand, an advantage of mirror ports is that
they can be activated as needed, whereas installing an inline
tap requires breaking the communications link. We have
assumed, however, that the necessary taps will be installed
permanently as part of the critical infrastructure system.)
3.2 Network capture method: Network inter-
face controllers versus data capture cards
Regardless of how raw data is accessed, via inline tap or
mirror port, the network packets need to be captured some-
how. If a standard Network Interface Controller (NIC) card
is used packets may be dropped due to being oversized, mal-
formed, too plentiful, etc. Also, packets may be reordered
from the sequence they appeared on the network due to the
multi-tasking nature of the host operating system [29]. Fur-
thermore, packets captured by a NIC are timestamped by
the host processor’s low-precision clock [1].
To overcome these inherent limitations with NICs, our so-
lution is to instead use a specialised data capture card, with
its own onboard packet timestamping capability, and facil-
ities for synchronising to a high-precision timing reference
such as a GPS clock.
3.3 Physical architecture
Taking both points above into account, the overall phys-
ical architecture of our data capture and replay solution is
shown in Figure 1. Given two pieces of control equipment
communicating via a switch, we place passive inline taps
(e.g., optical splitters) into the network and these are con-
nected to a specialised network capture card with onboard
timestamping and high-precision time synchronisation capa-
bilities.
This setup has a number of interesting secondary benefits
beyond capturing traffic accurately, such as the ability to
measure the time a packet takes to traverse a network. Mea-
suring packet transmission times to a high accuracy means
that critical infrastructure research and development engi-
neers can ensure that constraints on packet transmission
times specified in relevant international standards for critical
infrastructure [14] are met.
To instantiate the architecture in Figure 1 we used the
following equipment.
Control equipment As examples of typical Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs) used in critical infrastruc-
ture control systems we used a General Electric C60
Breaker Management Relay [8] and a Schweitzer Engi-
neering Laboratories SEL-421 Protection Automation
Control [25].
GPS time source As the high-precision time source we
used a Tekron TCG 01-G GNSS Timing Genera-
tor [26].
Specialised network capture card To create the spe-
cialised data capture card with onboard processing,
timestamping, and time synchronisation capabilities,
we used an Endace Data Acquisition and Generation
Card 7.5g4 [7].
3.4 Validation
To arrive at the architecture shown in Figure 1 we per-
formed a series of tests, described in Section 5. These tests
highlighted the quality of network capture timing in different
configurations. We began by using two computers with stan-
dard NICs synchronised using the Network Timing Proto-
col (NTP). We then progressed through NICs synchronised
using the newer Precision Timing Protocol (PTP), and fi-
nally specialised network capture cards synchronised with
one pulse per second (1pps) and PTP.
In our final design, the Endace Data Acquisition and Gen-
eration Card [7] we used has an onboard clock, which we
synchronised to a GPS time source, so that packets could
be timestamped at a very high fidelity. The particular card
used has a claimed timing accuracy of 7.5ns. Further, the
card has onboard storage such that no packets are lost on
any of its four gigabit interfaces. It also has a Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array (FPGA) onboard, which could be
programmed to do small computational tasks, such as Berke-
ley Packet Filtering (BPF).
3.5 Replaying data
After anomalous network traffic has been identified and
recorded, a forensics investigator may want to replay the
event. This allows potential mitigations to be tested. To
this end we investigated standard packet replaying tools. We
assessed the most commonly-used such tool, tcpreplay [3],
and showed it to suffer from cumulative timing drift, as well
as timing inaccuracy. By contrast we also tested our own
implementation using the Endace DAG card and showed
that the cumulative drift is eliminated, and the timing of
replayed packets is in the order of 1000 times more accurate.
Furthermore, it is sometimes necessary when replaying
packets from a stored packet capture file in an isolated test-
ing environment to change the source and destination ad-
dresses in the packet headers to allow them to be transmitted
in the different physical setup. To support this we developed
a graphical interface for critical parts of tcprewrite and tcp-
prep, which are Linux-based pcap manipulation tools. Using
our user interface, forensics investigators can update MAC
and IP addresses for some or all of the packets in a captured
network packet file.
3.6 Active tap capability
As noted above, in a critical infrastructure environment it
is essential that passive inline taps are used. One reason for
this is that active taps require the presence of power, so fail-
ure of an active tap will also compromise packet transmission
in the network being monitored. Nonetheless, in an isolated
testing environment active inline taps may be acceptable, so
Figure 2: Initial user interface in ‘capture’ mode.
we also measured how much delay such an active inline tap
adds to the network, using our Endace implementation.
This was possible by using a combination of our capture
and replay capabilities, with the user interface providing the
user with the ability to use the four-port Endace card as two
inline taps. Each pair of two ports can be used as an input
and an output, with the packets being captured and times-
tamped as they enter the card, before being retransmitted.
4. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe the capabilities of the user in-
terface and back-end software we developed to support the
hardware architecture presented in Section 3. The main fea-
tures required were capturing traffic, replaying traffic, mod-
ifying captured packets, and providing an inline tap mode.
4.1 Approach
Software development was done in C using low-level API
calls for the specialised network capture card [7]. Initially
this resulted in a prototype program involving thousands
of lines of code. It provided low-level control over network
traffic, but had persistent problems such as API calls fail-
ing. It was found that the card’s manufacturers recommend
using a serialisation wrapper for calls to the API, and the
prototype code thus became quite complex, even without
error checking. Instead, therefore, we reverted to using the
manufacturer’s high-level API functions for capturing data
packets, which resulted in the core non-user-interface code
for capturing packets being only a few hundred lines long.
The user interface for capturing packets was approximately
400 lines of code. Capturing packets was one of four main
areas of the developed tool, which also included an inline
tap capability and user interfaces for tcpprep and tcprewrite
functionality.
An error in the provided card interface was encountered,
involving termination of the inline tap once a buffer had
successfully been written to disk. After examining the man-
ufacturer’s source code, a logical error was identified such
that the thread responsible for writing to disk did not have
a valid way of terminating after successfully clearing the
buffer. This error caused the thread to loop every millisec-
Figure 3: User interface in ‘capture’ mode with se-
lections made.
ond indefinitely. To solve this problem, we ran the inline
tap capability in a separate thread terminated by the main
application upon completion.
4.2 Initialisation
Figure 2 shows the network capture user interface when
our tool is run. Prior to the graphical interface being dis-
played to the user, the following series of steps are executed.
1. Drivers and firmware for capture and replay are loaded.
2. The card is reset to its defaults, with port auto nego-
tiation turned on.
3. 128MB of system memory is allocated to the card, and
the tool is run in a mode which uses all of the available
CPU resources of a single thread (to aid in guarantee-
ing no packet loss).
4. The number of ports on the card are counted and the
port status checked for each.
5. The number of supported transmit streams are de-
tected.
After the above sequence, the graphical interface is updated
to reflect the capabilities of the installed card and user in-
teraction begins.
4.3 Capturing traffic
Figure 3 shows the network capture user interface. At the
top of the window an image of the packet capture card is
displayed. Which ports to capture from can be turned on or
off via the buttons on the left hand side and these selections
are displayed visually. At the bottom on the left is the folder
in which to save the captured traffic, and on the right is the
duration in seconds of the packet capture.
Once the user selects “Start” in the bottom right, the fol-
lowing sequence of steps are performed.
1. The DAG card is reset to its defaults and the capture
buffer is cleared.
Figure 4: tcprewrite graphical user interface, show-
ing modification of all source and destination MAC
addresses, for packets from a specific MAC address.
2. The maximum length of each packet is set to 9600 (the
maximum supported by the card), so that oversized
packets will be captured.
3. Variable length packets are enabled and packet padding
is disabled.
4. As per the ERF file format used by the card, alignment
parameters are set to allow future replay of captured
packets.
5. Network interface ports are enabled/disabled based on
the selections made by the user.
6. The capture time and destination folder are set based
on the selections made by the user.
7. A unique output filename is created using the current
date and time.
At the completion of the packet capture, a “Capture Com-
plete” popup is presented to the user.
4.4 Replaying traffic
The interface for replaying traffic is very similar to the
interface for capturing traffic, shown in Figure 3. The dif-
ference is the selection of “Replay”, instead of “Capture”, at
the top of the window. The packets are replayed in the same
order, and with the same inter-packet delays, as recorded in
the file to be replayed.
Packet capture and replay were validated. Firstly, packet
capture was validated using NetworkMiner, a forensic anal-
ysis tool [12]. However, since the output of our tool is in
the ERF format used by the network card, which is not
recognised by NetworkMiner, editcap [28] with encapsula-
tion type set to Ethernet frames was used to convert ‘.erf’
files to ‘.pcap’ format without ERF headers. The contents
of the captured file were found to be an accurate capture of
the data that was sent. For replay, NetworkMiner was not
suitable for comparisons based on timing. Initial compar-
isons were made using Wireshark, and detailed analysis was
completed using Python scripts and C code. For detailed
experimental results on packet generation and capture, see
Section 5.4.
4.5 Modifying captured traffic
To replay traffic captured in a live system in a separate
test environment requires updating hardware Media Access
Control (MAC) or Internet Protocol (IP) addresses for the
new environment. To support this capability for system en-
gineers users who are not familiar with Linux command-line
Figure 5: Inline tap user interface.
tools, we implemented a user interface for critical parts of
tcprewrite and tcpprep [4, 2]. An example of one of the in-
terfaces provided is shown in Figure 4. In this example, the
user is searching for all packets with a source MAC address of
11:22:33:44:55:66 and is setting all source MAC addresses for
those packets to a1:b2:c3:d4:e5:f6 and all destination MAC
addresses for those packets to 01:23:45:67:89:10.
4.6 Inline network tap mode
For use in an isolated testing environment, where inter-
fering with network traffic is not an issue, we allowed the
specialised network capture card to be configured as an ac-
tive inline tap, thereby allowing packets to be manipulated
“on the fly”. To do this, bidirectional forwarding between
two ports, while capturing the traffic, was required. Al-
though the simplest way to achieve this may appear to be
copying the input buffer from one port directly to the out-
put buffer of another port, this only provides the forwarding
capability and not the capture capability. To capture traffic
at the same time, the stream from buffer to buffer needs to
be duplicated. The user interface for the inline tap is shown
in Figure 5.
Once inline tap mode was working for a pair of ports, the
functionality was expanded to create a dual inline tap on the
four port card. The two taps are marked in the generated
ERF file. The Endace card is manufactured in two-port and
four-port versions, so we allowed for the possibility of using
the network card to act as either one or two inline taps.
An optional Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) can be applied
when using this inline tap mode. For example, “icmp” may
be entered on the user interface to only forward packets past
the inline tap that are of the ICMP protocol. However, this
matching is performed on the host computer’s CPU, rather
than on the network capture card, and as such a latency
measured in milliseconds is added if the BPF functionality
is used.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we analyse the performance of our com-
bined hardware (Section 3) and software (Section 4) solu-
tion to the problem of cyber-physical network capture and
replay.
Our experiments firstly identified the timing accuracy
of sending and receiving under different configurations.
GPS Time Source
Sender Computer Receiver Computer
Card
under test
Card
under test
Figure 6: Generic physical experimental setup.
These included typical state-of-the-art configurations cur-
rently used in critical infrastructure development and fault
finding, including using standard NIC interfaces to capture
data and to generate or replay data for testing. At best,
these NICs will be synchronised using either the standard
Network Timing Protocol or the newer and more accurate
Precision Timing Protocol. The standard tool, tcpreplay,
was used to replay the test data for these typical setups.
These experiments provided a baseline, and also provided
evidence of a flaw in using tcpreplay. Using these baselines,
we then showed that our solution is in the order of 1000
times more accurate, and also overcomes the identified flaw
in tcpreplay.
Having demonstrated that we can send and receive at a
very high accuracy, measured in nanoseconds, we performed
two further sets of experiments. Firstly, we used our de-
veloped tool in its active inline tap mode. The process of
acquiring data from a network on one port, and putting the
data back onto the network on another port, inevitably takes
time. Knowledge of just how much time this takes is essen-
tial for anyone using such an inline tap. Finally, with the
knowledge of how long our active inline tap solution takes,
we then used two active inline taps to timestamp the same
packets at different points in a network, thereby demonstrat-
ing the ability to use our tool to record how long packets take
to traverse a network, to a known accuracy.
5.1 Experimental setup
Our generic experimental setup is shown in Figure 6. This
configuration sometimes changed slightly depending on the
test. One computer was running a Debian 7-based distri-
bution of Linux and the other was running running Cen-
tOS v7.0. CentOS is a free enterprise operating system
based on the Red Hat version of Linux, with Red Hat being
the version of Linux commonly used when Linux is required
in critical infrastructure, due to its support. A protocol-
oriented depiction of our experimental setup is shown in
Figure 7.
In each experiment, a packet capture file, with known tim-
ings, was replayed through one network card and captured
on another network card. The time when a packet was cap-
tured was compared with when it was sent, both as an abso-
lute value from the test’s beginning (e.g., packet 2000 should
have arrived 8 seconds after the first packet was sent) and
as a relative value between consecutive packets (e.g., packet
2000 should have arrived 0.001s after the 1999th packet was
sent). All experiments were run 100 times and their results
averaged, such that the data presented in the graphs, start-
Endace
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NTP
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GPS Time
Source
Figure 7: Protocol communication flows in the ex-
perimental setup.
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Figure 8: Average cumulative error of the duration
between when the first packet is sent and when the
nth packet is sent compared with when the first
packet is received and the nth packet is received,
with packets sent using tcpreplay for 100 NIC-to-
NIC tests synchronised using NTP.
ing with Figure 8, has each point as the average of 100 tests.
Non-averaged results are discussed in each section. Where
tcpreplay was used, the version used was 4.1.
5.2 NIC to NIC, synchronised using NTP,
sending using tcpreplay
In this experiment, we used tcpreplay to send packets from
a standard network interface controller (NIC 1 in Figure 7)
to another network interface controller (NIC 2) which we
observed using Wireshark. We synchronised the sender and
the receiver using NTP [20] generated from our GPS clock,
using secondary NICs in each machine. This is the standard
setup most test environments would use to replay data. We
therefore used this test as a baseline to identify issues with
sending and receiving. The error between when a packet is
sent, and when it is received, is shown in Figure 8.
Note the obvious cumulative error shown in Figure 8, as
well as the individual packet errors, when tcpreplay is used.
For further discussion and more results from the NTP test,
see Section 5.3.
5.3 NIC to NIC, synchronised using PTP,
sending using tcpreplay
This experiment was the same as that in Section 5.2 ex-
cept the two NICs were synchronised using PTP [13]. The
Precision Timing Protocol is an enhancement on NTP, pro-
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Figure 9: Average cumulative error of the duration
between when the first packet is sent and when the
nth packet is sent compared with when the first
packet is received and the nth packet is received,
with packets sent using tcpreplay for 100 NIC-to-
NIC tests synchronised using PTP.
viding sub-microsecond accuracy [13]. The error between
when a packet is sent, and when it is received, is shown in
Figure 9.
Figures 8 and 9 clearly demonstrate the cumulative na-
ture of the error between when packets are received com-
pared with when they should have been. This error became
quite significant as our tests involved sending 241 packets
over 9.22 seconds; for the last packet the error was almost a
millisecond on average.
It seems that tcpreplay measures the delay to add between
each packet, and adds that delay to the time after the last
packet was sent, thus aggregating (correctly) all the delays
and adding (incorrectly) all of the time taken to send each
of the packets. To further test this issue with tcpreplay, we
replayed data out of one NIC and back into a secondary NIC
on the same computing device (thus omitting issues with
time synchronisation), whilst still synchronising the device
to the GPS signal using PTP through a tertiary NIC. In the
case the aggregating nature of the absolute error when using
tcpreplay to replay packets was still clearly evident. Further,
we replayed using tcpreplay and captured using our Endace
solution to rule out the possibility that the source of the
error was data being captured via Wireshark or tcpdump.
In this case the same error was still present. The cumulative
error was only removed once tcpreplay was replaced with our
software.
Having identified the cumulative error when using tcpre-
play, we then analysed the data again to identify any er-
ror in the durations between consecutive packets. The re-
sults of this analysis, for both NTP and PTP, are shown in
Figure 10. Each point in Figure 10 is the average for 100
tests. The greatest error margin for a single duration be-
tween two consecutive packets when sending tcpreplay and
synchronised using NTP was 206µs and for PTP was 369µs.
However, on average PTP had a better inter-packet error at
15.5µs compared with NTP’s average error of 17.1µs. Never-
theless, as shown in Figure 10, since both NTP and PTP are
software timestamped, and CPUs are multitasking, regard-
less of which is used to synchronise the sender and the re-
ceiver there are significant timing variations with both PTP
and NTP.
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Figure 10: Comparison of inter-packet errors in the
NTP and PTP NIC-to-NIC experiments of Figure 8
(NTP) and Figure 9 (PTP).
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Figure 11: Average error in the interval between
packets at the sender versus the interval between
packets at the receiver, with packets sent using our
forensics tool for 100 Endace-to-Endace tests syn-
chronised using 1pps and PTP.
5.4 Endace to Endace, synchronised using
1pps and PTP, sending using our solution
Having measured the performance of standard solutions
(Sections 5.2 and 5.3), we then started testing our own solu-
tion (Sections 3 and 4). In this test we replayed using calls
to the Endace drivers rather than tcpreplay, and captured
using the specialised network capture card and our own soft-
ware rather than a NIC. One of our two Endace cards (an
older model) used a 1 pulse per second (1pps) signal from
our GPS clock, while the other Endace card used a PTP
signal from the GPS clock. Using this testing method, there
was zero cumulative error, unlike the tcpreplay tests. The
results of this experiment are shown in Figure 11.
Since there was no error accumulation in the results of
this test, unlike those shown in Figure 8 (NTP) and Figure 9
(PTP), we can immediately compare the results in Figure 11
with those in Figure 10. It should be noted that the results
of this test were in the order of 1000 times better, with
most errors being less than 10ns on average in Figure 11,
compared with 10µs in Figure 10.
Further, analysing the data individually revealed that the
worst error for the delay between two packets experienced
by our solution was 46ns, compared with 206µs and 369µs
for NTP and PTP, respectively, over NICs. The average
value for the error in the delay between two packets using
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Figure 12: Error introduced due to recording from
a NIC.
our software and the Endace cards was 8.9ns.
We used standard tolerance interval statistical calcula-
tions for a mean of 8.9ns and a standard deviation of 7ns,
across our 240 inter-packet intervals and 100 tests to show
that with 99% confidence, 99% of the inter-packet interval
errors will be within −10ns to +27ns.
5.5 Endace to NIC, synchronised using 1pps
and PTP, sending using our solution
Having demonstrated the accuracy of the Endace to En-
dace solution in the test described in Section 5.4, we replaced
the receiver with a standard NIC, to demonstrate the issue
of recording either from a mirror port or from an inline tap,
using a standard computer-hosted NIC. The results of this
experiment are shown in Figure 12.
Having seen that the maximum error from the experi-
ment in Section 5.4 was 46ns, and the tolerance interval
was −10ns to +27ns, we see in Figure 12 that by replacing
the receiver with a standard NIC the average error increases
to 17µs and the maximum individual inter-packet interval
error became 234µs. Hence, almost all of the error is due to
the NIC itself, further demonstrating the weakness of using
a standard NIC to record data in time-critical network.
5.6 Endace to Endace, synchronised using
1pps, active inline tap duration
In the experiment described in Section 5.4 we showed that
sending and receiving between the specialised network cards
can be done with nanosecond accuracy. In a test environ-
ment, our solution can be used as an active inline tap, using
our software and by physically connecting the network ca-
ble into one port of the network card, and out of the second
port on the network card. The active inline tap means that
packets can be completely captured (no packet loss) with
timestamping more accurate than using a NIC on a com-
puter connected to either an inline tap or mirror port (as
demonstrated by the results described in Section 5.5).
In this experiment we ran 100 tests with ports 1 and 2 on
the specialised capture card as an inline tap, and then used
the output from port 2 as the input to ports 3 and 4 which
were also used as an inline tap. The difference between
the timestamps on packets passing through ports 1 and 2,
compared with when they passed through ports 3 and 4, was
the additional time that using the specialised hardware as
an active inline tap adds to the transmission time of packets.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 13.
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0 500 1000 1500 2000
m
ill
ise
co
nd
s
Packets
Figure 13: Additional time added in inline tap mode
using our solution.
The experiments showed that the addtional time added
to the end-to-end transmission time of packets, by having
the active inline tap in the network path, was in the or-
der of 12µs. While this compares favourably with the 17µs
added by recording using a standard NIC, it should be noted
that using the specialised network capture card in this con-
figuration is only meant as a convenient testing tool, in a
laboratory setting. As shown in our intended architecture
in Figure 1, a passive inline tap (e.g., an optical splitter),
which adds negligible additional time, should be used in a
“live” system, and then the specialised network capture card
can record from the passive inline tap with low nanosecond
accuracy.
5.7 Endace to Endace, synchronised using
1pps, transmission duration
Having shown in the experiment described in Section 5.6
how much overhead inserting our tool adds to the end-to-
end transmission time, we then used two instances of our
tool, synchronised using a GPS clock, to timestamp the same
packet at two different points in a network. This provides
a measurement, to a known accuracy, of the time taken for
a packet to traverse a network. End-to-end packet trans-
mission duration is essential knowledge in a time-sensitive
environment such as a critical cyber-physical system. In par-
ticular, some protocols in critical infrastructure have trans-
mission time limits, such as the GOOSE protocol’s 3ms limit
as specified in IEC Standard 61850 [15].
In this experiment the passive taps shown in Figure 1
were replaced with the Endace card acting as an active tap.
The control equipment IEDs were as specified in Section 3.3,
and the GE-C60 and SEL-421 devices were configured as a
GOOSE publisher and subscriber pair. Four switches were
placed between the two IEDs. The inline taps were placed
between each IED and its corresponding edge switch. The
results of this test, capturing traffic for 30 minutes, resulted
in 1797 packet durations, as shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14 immediately provides two insights useful in a
testing environment. Firstly, the mean (average) transmis-
sion time was 1.168ms but this figure is severely skewed
by the three outlying values. It should be noted that Fig-
ure 14, has a logarithmic y-axis for the time value to ac-
commodate the outlying values which included a maximum
value of 177.024ms. Since these three values, out of the 1797
packet durations, were so different from the rest of the val-
ues, median and mode values were used to provide clarity
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Figure 14: GOOSE packet transmission time across a four switch network using an active inline tap.
regarding “typical” values. The median (middle) transmis-
sion time was 0.784ms and the mode (the value that occurs
the most) transmission time was 0.784ms. Therefore, ig-
noring the small number of outliers, Figure 14 tells us that
the typical transmission time across the network is approx-
imately 0.784ms.
The second observation of significance, which demon-
strates the usefulness of this tool in a test environment, is
the bursty nature of the traffic as indicated by the saw-tooth
pattern of the graph. Such a graph would be useful to a net-
work designer as it suggests that one or more of the switches
creates a buffer before releasing all of the accumulated data
at once. The active inline tap could then be easily moved
throughout the network to identify which devices are caus-
ing the bursty traffic. Similarly, the inline tap could also
be moved throughout the network to identify the sources of
delays, if they are repeatable, of the significantly outlying
values for transmission time duration. Such analyses would
facilitate potential remediation of issues, with the effective-
ness of potential solutions also being testable using our tool.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The ability to capture all network traffic and replay it ac-
curately is essential for network forensics investigations. Our
research was motivated by the need for such a tool to use in
power distribution substations (and their testing facilities).
Due to their hard real-time constraints, such cyber-physical
systems introduce additional challenges beyond those found
in general-purpose networks, making traditional solutions
based on Network Interface Cards inadequate.
Here we have described a hardware-software solution that
builds on a special-purpose network interface card to pro-
duce a tool which (a) guarantees to capture all data packets,
and preserve their original sequencing, (b) during data cap-
ture does not interfere with the network traffic in any way,
and (c) allows the captured traffic to be replayed precisely,
including its original timing. Installed in an appropriate
configuration, this tool can support unintrusive monitoring
of “live” control system data traffic and reproducible exper-
imentation with security incidents in an isolated testing fa-
cility.
A possible extension of this system would be to allow data
capture at the bit level (1s and 0s), rather than whole pack-
ets only, which would be useful for forensics investigators
exploring malformed network traffic. However, our exper-
iments show that the firmware in the current Endace card
used only allows capture of “packets”, as opposed to “bits”,
so new firmware needs to be developed to support this ex-
tension.
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